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The first reference to a military industrial complex (MIC) was made by US President 
Eisenhower in 1961. He then referred to something historically specific: the build-up of  
a large permanent military establishment and a permanent arms industry, which raised his 
concerns  for  the  unwarranted  influence  of  these  societal  forces.  Subsequently  the 
meaning of the MIC evolved to refer to the vested interests within the state and industry 
in expanding the military sector and in increasing military spending, with external threats 
providing the justification. During the Cold War, when the defence was strongly focused 
on  deterrence,  this  produced  a  set  of  specific  state-industry  relationships  that  in  turn 
generated a beneficial environment for the development and strengthening of the MIC. 
With the end of the Cold War, the conditions for a strong MIC were less favourable, at 
least initially, with changes in the international security environment, cuts in military 
spending  and  arms  production,  and  ensuing  privatisation,  commercialisation,  and 
internationalisation  of  military  activities  as  well  as  of  arms  production.  This  paper 
discusses how the MIC has been affected by these changes and the degree to which there 
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 Introduction 
 
Dwight Eisenhower, an ex-military Republican President of the USA, in his 1961 
Farewell Address was the first to express concern about the impact of the ‘conjunction of 
an immense military establishment and a large arms industry’, which, he noted, was ‘new 
in American experience’. He alerted councils of governments, saying that ‘we must guard 
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the 
military-industrial complex [MIC]. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist.’ (Eisenhower 1961:162). Subsequently, the concept of the 
military-industrial complex was developed by social scientists, being seen as  
coalitions of vested interests within the state and industry, which could lead to decisions 
being made which were in the interest of the coalition members and not necessarily in the 
interests of national security. This coalition was expanded to include not only interests 
within the military establishment and the arms industry but also within the political 
organs (Dunne, 1995).  
 
Much of the work on the MIC sees it as a fairly clear and constant feature of the Cold 
War,  when  threats  were  overemphasized  to  justify  absurdly  high  levels  of  military 
spending. In the literature it is used to represent the groups within society that benefit 
from  military  spending  and  its  growth,  but  what  is  meant  by  it  is  often  vague  and 
sometimes  inconsistent  (Fine,  1993).  With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  the  security 
environment changed radically and initially this had a profound impact on the military 
sector.  Post-Cold  War  reductions  in  military  expenditures  and  changes  in  military 
requirements and technology led to considerable changes in the Defence Industrial Base 
(DIB) and in the relations between the DIB, the military and the legislature (that is where 
the pork-barrelling takes place) (Chapman and Yudken, 1992).  
 
This  paper  considers  the  nature  of  the  MIC,  how  the  changes  in  the  new  security 
environment have affected it and indeed whether the concept of a MIC is still useful. 
Finally, it assesses the present state of the MIC and its likely future prospects and the 
challenges for governance. 
 
The Military Industrial Complex 
 
The core of any theorising on the Military Industrial Complex is the existence of a strong 
Defence Industrial Base around which vested interests can coalesce. What Smith (1977) 
characterises as the liberal or institutional approach, hinges on the nature of an MIC as 
composed of conflicting interest groups and institutional linkages. The MIC becomes a 
self generating structure (agency) which embodies the interests of various groups in 
society. The strength of the vested interests and their competition for resources leads to 
internal pressures for military spending, where external threats are often exaggerated to 
provide necessary justification.  This leads to the MIC imposing an unnecessary burden 
on the rest of society and having adverse effects on the civilian sector. It crowds out 
civilian resources, and the companies involved develop a culture which leads to 
inefficiency and waste and an increasing reliance on defence contracts as they become 
less able to compete in the civilian market (Melman ,1985; and Dumas, 1986). The   3
theoretical underpinnings of this work were originally based on C Wright Mill's analysis 
of the power elite, but there are also variants, which follow a Weberian focus on the role 
of bureaucracy and the work of Galbraith on coalitions (Slater and Nardin, 1973) and, in 
the US context, the work of Veblen on the importance of the military ‘waste’ to the 
ideological and institutional structure of the US economy (Cypher, 2008). 
 
There is also some work on the MIC from a Marxist perspective, with a number of 
strands which tend to differ in their treatment of crisis and in the extent to which they see 
military expenditure as necessary for capital accumulation (Dunne and  Sköns, 2010; 
Dunne, 1990). Best known is the underconsumptionist approach developed from the 
work of Baran and Sweezy (1966) which sees military spending as important in 
preventing realisation crises,  by allowing the absorption of surplus without increasing 
wages, unlike other forms of government spending, and so maintaining profits. A similar 
perspective, but one which focuses on the tendency for capitalist economies to 
overproduce is the permanent arms economy. In this theory, military expenditure is 
wasteful and the allocation of resources into it prevents overheating. Thus the 
inefficiencies of the MIC and the DIB can be seen as positive factors, and the 
development of the MIC plays a positive role in capitalist development (Howard and 
King, 1992).  
 
While the concept of an MIC grew out of the particular historical circumstances of the 
Cold War, it appears to be of most value as a descriptive rather than an analytical concept 
(Fine, 1993). This has led some researchers to focus on the dynamics of the MIC at an 
empirical level, with Smith and Smith (1983) arguing that the MIC should be seen as a 
coalition of interests and that the focus should be on the structural pairings that have 
developed between particular sections of private industry and particular parts of the 
military, which have inevitably led to mutual interests. Considering the concept of an 
MIC in this way means that there is no reason that the concept of a MIC cannot remain a 
useful way to understand the dynamics of the modern military sector.   
 
The Changing Security Environment 
 
The end of the Cold War saw profound changes in the international security environment. 
World military expenditures and arms exports peaked in the mid-1980s, fell gradually at 
first with improving East-West relations, then fell rapidly with the disintegration of the 
Soviet  Union.  While  military  expenditures  in  post-Soviet  states  (most  notably  its 
successor state, Russia) ended up at a fraction of those of the USSR, reductions in the US 
were not as radical, thus reflecting the US dominance in the post-Cold War world.  
 
The fixed costs of R&D for major systems continue to grow, both for platforms and for 
the infrastructure (e.g. satellites, strategic air assets) and information systems needed to 
support  network-centred  warfare,  part  of the  so called  Revolution  in Military  Affairs 
(RMA). Given the long lead-times and the commitments made by government bodies, 
research teams and companies, pressures remain to continue to produce these weapons 
systems and to find roles for them. Together with the resistance to cut defence plans at   4
the same rate as defence budgets for their financing, in particualr in the US, this created a 
mismatch which produced a pressure for renewed increases in military spending. 
 
During the 2000s, it became increasingly clear that the US and Europe (NATO) were 
unlikely to face an enemy that could provide a symmetric response with more informal 
asymmetric  guerrilla-type  conflicts  more  likely,  requiring  rather  different  weapons 
systems. This uncertainty about the enemy and the growth of ‘homeland security’ are 
changing  the  nature  of  demand.  In  particular  they  are  making  communications  and 
surveillance  technologies  increasingly  important.  NATO  and  EU  troops  are  also 
increasingly involved in peacekeeping roles around the world. Apart from changing the 
nature and structure of the forces, these changes moved demand towards high technology 
systems where much of new development took place in the civilian ICT sector. Thus, 
while many of the long-term weapon programmes initiated during the Cold War remain, 
there has at the same time been a clear and important qualitative change in the nature of 
technology (Brzoska, 2005; Dunne and  Sköns, 2010) .  
 
As a result of a long-term rapid development in many civilian technologies, the relative 
positions  of  military  and  civilian  technology  have  been  reversed  in  several  areas  of 
sophisticated  technology.  From  the  end  of  World  War  II  to  the  1980s,  military 
technology had tended to be in advance of civilian technology, but by the 1990s in many 
areas, particularly electronics, military technology lagged the civilian sector. This was 
largely because the long lead-times involved in military procurement meant that much of 
the technology was obsolete before the system came into service (Smith, 2009) Whereas 
in the past the spin-off of military technology to the civilian sector was an important 
argument  for  the  value  of  military  production,  now  there  is  more  spin-in  of  civilian 
technology to the military. Many areas of technology which were once the preserve of the 
military and security services, such as cryptography, are now dominated by commercial 
applications and an increasing number of components that go into the major weapons 
systems  are  commercial  ‘off-the-shelf’  (COTS)  products,  produced  by  manufacturers 
who would not necessarily see themselves as part of the arms industry (Brzoska, 2005). 
Companies in the electronics and IT sectors, that in the past had little involvement with 
arms production are finding themselves part of the defence industrial base and sometimes 
the target of diversification efforts by the major arms producers (Sköns & Dunne, 2008; 
Dunne, 1995; Dunne et al, 2007).  
 
Production of major weapon systems is concentrated in relatively few states, in contrast 
to small arms production, which is relatively standard and widely dispersed. Although 
defence  companies  rely  on  domestic  support  through  procurement  and  support  for 
exports and so are not truly ‘transnational’, they have, nonetheless, internationalised, with 
major non-US defence companies also seeking to buy defence contractors in the US as a 
means of entering this large defence market. Companies are also changing their supply 
chains, reflecting internationalisation . Governments are increasingly willing to recognise 
that the costs of high-technology research and development when combined with smaller 
national  production  runs  have  made  it  more  necessary  to  make  economies  of  scale 
through  international  collaboration  and  industrial  restructuring.  This  is  very  different   5
from  the  position  a  few  decades  ago  when  governments  aimed  to  maintain  a 
comprehensive national industrial base for defence (Dunne and Sköns, 2010).  
 
The outsourcing of functions that once were provided by the military has resulted in a 
profound  expansion  of  the  military  services  industry  (Singer  2003;  Wulf  2005).  This 
development  has  been  reinforced  in  particular  by  the  war  in  Iraq,  for  which  a  great 
number of military services companies have been contracted. As a result, the number of 
major  companies  specializing  in  provision  of  military  services  has  increased  (Perlo-
Freeman  and    Sköns,  2008).  This  trend  could  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  defence 
specialisation of all but the major contractors and changes in the nature of the companies 
involved in the defence sector, with an increase in IT and service contractors with the 
growth of privatisation across Europe. (Dunne, 2006; Dunne and Surry, 2006).  Barriers 
to entry are likely to remain considerable as the marketing of military products differs 
from commercial products and personal contacts and networking are likely to remain 
more important than general advertising (Dunne &  Sköns, 2010).  
 
Overall, while there have been significant changes in the industry part of the MIC, the 
changed nature of the companies should not obscure the fact that many of the features of 
the Cold War industry remain. The major contractors, although there are less of them and 
they  have  ‘hollowed  out’  and  often  diversified  into  new  security  products,  are  still 
dominant and often have considerable monopoly power and influence on government 
policy. Internationalisation has given them new freedoms, but they are still dependent on 
the home market and government support. The newcomers have developed successfully 
in some of the new areas, but have not successfully displaced the incumbents in the core 
areas of arms production.  
 
State Industry Relations 
 
With the end of the Cold War, governments changed their attitudes to the arms industry. 
The resulting cuts in military spending, called into question the ability of even the major 
countries to maintain a comprehensive indigenous defence industrial base. Governments 
were in a position where the change in the security environment made it harder to justify 
previous levels of support for the industry and 'competitive procurement policies aimed at 
value  for  money  were  introduced in  a  number  of  countries’  (Dunne  and  Macdonald, 
2001). In the US there was a striking change in industrial policy. During the Cold War 
industrial planning was undertaken through the Pentagon, but this was only an implicit 
industrial planning. In 1993 a merger wave was stimulated by the ‘last supper’ when 
Pentagon Deputy Secretary, William Perry, told a dinner of defence industry executives 
that  the  DOD  would  begin  subsidizing  mergers  that  were  expected  to  result  in  cost 
savings. This policy ended when the process had resulted in a degree of concentration 
that was considered to be detrimental for competition and thus the cost trends that the 
DOD  had  sought  to  prevent,  and  a  proposed  merger  between  Lockheed  Martin  and 
Northrop Grumman was blocked in early 1997 (Markusen and Costigan, 1999).  
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In Europe, with a number of smaller defence markets, restructuring necessarily involved 
cross-border mergers, which raised political issues. The major players in Europe also had 
quite different ownership structures, including a substantial degree of state ownership in 
France.  Both  factors  made  a  financially-driven  merger  boom  of  the  US  type  more 
difficult.  Nonetheless,  there  was  an  increase  in  concentration  and  by  2005  the  West 
European  restructuring  process  had  resulted  in  a  web  of  cross-border  ownership  and 
collaboration relationships in aerospace and electronics, while Europe-wide integration in 
other sectors was more limited. The developing defence industrial networks also had a 
rather significant transatlantic dimension (Dunne &  Sköns, 2010).  
 
Concentration  in the  defence  industry  is  still not  as high as  in  comparable  high-tech 
industries, however, suggesting that market forces have not been allowed to work freely 
in the procurement, production and sales of weapon systems. This could also be the result 
of  a  segmentation  of  the  arms  industry  with  strong  concentration  in  aerospace  and 
electronics and less in other defence industrial sectors. At the systems level in aerospace 
and electronics oligopolist tendencies are emerging at the international level, while in 
other sectors industry remains nationally fragmented (Sköns, 2009; Dunne et al, 2007). 
 
In  addition,  the  privatization  of  previously  state-owned  companies  impacted  on  the 
integration  of  the  West  European  defence  industry  as  previously  state  controlled 
companies were forced to operate according to corporate business principles. The true 
impact on government influence and control is less clear, however, and differs across 
countries depending on their government’s policy towards their private defence industry. 
What may turn out as being more important in the long run is the emergence of a security 
industry outside the traditional defence industry: the privatized military industry engaged 
in  outsourced  military  services  that  has  previously  been  provided  within  the  military 
establishment, and the security industry engaged in the provision of goods and services 
for personal safety, primarily to the private sector but increasingly also to the government 
sector (Sköns, 2009). 
 
The location of defence industries and facilities has historically reflected security issues 
with the result that there are defence dependent communities in various locations within 
any country with a large defence industry. The changing nature of the industry and of 
security means the geographical pattern is also changing. Closures cause considerable 
problems for communities as often the jobs lost are rather different to those available. 
While  evidence  suggests that  defence  workers,  given  their  high  skills,  find  new jobs 
relatively easily, it is usually lower-paid work and there is considerable disruption. The 
increased  internationalisation  of  the  supply  chain  also  has  implications  for  the 
geographical distribution of production and employment, reducing the major contractors’ 
impact on their traditional local economies (Dunne &  Sköns, 2010; Dunne, 2006).  
 
All of these developments have led to a set of state-industry relations that look rather 
different to those of the old Cold War MIC, but they still suggest a dominant role for 
national governments and continuing close links between government, industry and the 
military.  In Europe privatisation has reduced direct state links, but indirect ones remain 
powerful, though in some ways less visible, as in the US. The composition of the vested   7
interests has changed and expanded, but they still remain a powerful lobbying group in 
all countries. 
 
Conclusions: Continuity and Change 
 
The idea of a Military Industrial Complex was a useful concept for understanding the 
success  of  the  military  establishment  in  receiving  unprecedented  government  budget 
allocations  in  the  USA  and  other  advanced  economies  during  the  Cold  War.  It  is  a 
problematic  concept  theoretically,  but  it  retains  much  of  its  value  in  understanding 
developments in military spending and arms production after the end of the Cold War. 
The components of the MIC may have changed but the dynamic and impact of vested 
interests remain.  
 
Internationally,  there  is  increasing  US  dominance,  with  US  and  European  links 
developing  and  increasingly  geographically  dispersed  supply  chains.  The  old  arms 
producers  remain  dominant,  though  they  have  restructured,  becoming  systems 
integrators,  outsourcing  to  civil  companies  and  internationally,  and  spinning  in  civil 
technologies and components, rather than spinning off innovations for the civil sector.  
There are a lot of new companies entering in the new security areas, some of whom do 
not know they are involved in arms production as their civil products are integrated into 
arms systems. New important players have emerged and there have been a considerable 
number of takeovers by the old primes to acquire expertise in new areas.  
 
There have been marked changes in Europe, with privatisation and EU level legislation 
changing  the  state  industry  relations.  Whether  this  is  a  move  in  the  direction  of  a 
European  wide  MIC  is  unclear,  as  the  transatlantic  links  would  seem  to  be  US-UK. 
Certainly the privatisation of European companies is altering state-industry relations to 
something closer to that in the US and there are numerous examples show how close and 
sometimes murky that relationship can be. 
 
It seems clear that changes have taken place, but that there is also considerable continuity 
in the structure of the vested interest that make up the MIC and in its influence. It is still a 
political rather than economic logic that controls the international arms market at heart. 
There are clear governance issues as the restructuring could be argued to have left an 
MIC that is just as pervasive and powerful, but considerably less visible, less controllable 
and more international.  Any future attempts to control and manage the sector will need 
to operate at an international rather than just a national level.  
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